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Quantity versus Quality: 
The Impact of Environmental Disclosures on the Reputations of UK Plcs 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The theoretical framework of this paper integrates quality-signalling theory and the 
resource based view of the firm to test the differential effects of the quantity and 
quality of environmental disclosures on the firm’s environmental reputation. 
Uniquely, the study uses a quality-adjusted method of content analysis, so that 
sentences are not merely counted but also weighted to reflect their likely significance. 
Investments in research and development and diversification, as potential methods of 
enhancing of environmental reputation, are also considered. In doing so the paper 
complements and extends the work of Toms (2002). The results confirm the 
framework and models tested in the original paper on more recent data and also 
suggest that quality of environmental disclosure rather than mere quantity has a 
stronger effect on the creation of environmental reputation amongst executive and 
investor stakeholder groups. Research and development expenditure, and under 
certain circumstances, diversification, also add to reputation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a comparison between qualitative and quantitative measures of 
environmental activity, as disclosed in annual reports and compares their relative 
impact on the environmental reputation of the company. Such a comparison is useful 
for the purpose of establishing whether or not managers can use quality signals to 
create environmental reputation or whether this reputation and intermediate disclosure 
activities merely follow from the principal objective features of the organisation, such 
as size, activities and so on. Intuition and theoretical linkages between the intangible 
resource base of the firm and the ability of the firm to offer genuine qualitative signals 
to the most powerful stakeholder groups, suggest the qualitative nature of 
environmental disclosure, as opposed to mere volume, is more likely to enhance the 
environmental reputation of the firm. This proposition follows from prior survey 
research reported in this journal by Toms (2002), which established that qualitative 
disclosures are strongly linked to reputation enhancement. Although Toms (2002) 
showed that narrative lacking in verifiable content lacked credibility, it did not reveal 
an impact for the volume of environmental disclosure, regardless of its qualitative 
content. At the same time, however, it has been recognised that dependence on simple 
number of disclosures might be misleading (Frost & Seamer, 2002).  
The principal objective of this paper is, therefore, to compare the impact of the 
extent of total environmental responsibility disclosures with the effects of specific 
quality signals. In an area of financial reporting dominated by voluntarism, these are 
the generic options available to managers about how to report the impact of 
organisational activities on the environment. These might range from generalised 
narrative on the one hand, to highly specific and costly to imitate quality signals on 
the other. But which type of environmental disclosures should managers select in 
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order to enhance the environmental reputation of the business? Re-testing the Toms 
(2002) model with reference to both types of disclosure will provide answers to this 
question. 
A second important justification for the paper is the relative neglect of the 
relationship between disclosure and reputation. Studies investigating the social 
disclosure and financial performance relationship are much more common, but in 
aggregate are inconclusive or neutral (Ullmann, 1985, McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) or 
where the association appears positive, is mediated by the effects of reputation 
(Orlitzky et al, 2003). Other studies have investigated the reputation and financial 
performance link and found a stronger association (Herremans et al, 1993, Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002, Toms, 2000). In view of the commonality of the disclosure and 
reputation link in both these lines of prior research, and the relative lack of evidence 
on the direct relationship between the two, and the poor performance of financial 
variables, this study fills a significant gap and extends the research agenda.  
An important feature of the Toms (2002) was the use of the Resource Based 
View (RBV). According to this approach, there are a large number of potentially 
valuable and difficult to replicate assets that might lead to enhanced reputation, 
including environmental reputation. The empirical models in the Toms (2002) paper 
did not attempt to include all possible relevant variables in this respect, and the 
current paper therefore aims to extend the research by including two that are of 
potential importance. First, research and development (R&D) has been shown to be 
important in other aspects of corporate social and environmental responsibility 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Second and in similar vein, corporate diversification 
has been shown to be an important managerial variable affecting competitive 
advantage (Markides & Williamson, 1996), but has not been incorporated into social 
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and environmental accounting research. Arguably, it is important to do so, since the 
more lines of business engaged in, the more likely that the need for social and 
environmental disclosures will arise. A secondary objective of the current paper is, 
therefore, to extend the Toms (2002) model to include these potentially relevant 
variables. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides 
a brief outline of the prior literature relating to the relationship between corporate 
environmental disclosure and corporate environmental performance, as measured by 
environmental reputation. The research hypothesis is then developed and is followed 
by a discussion of the samples and tests. The results are then analysed. Finally, a 
concluding section discusses the implications of the results.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION: THEORY AND 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Reviewing research into the relationship between social disclosure and social 
performance, Ullmann (1985) notes the lack of theorising and that the field has been 
dominated by empirical studies, which has produced inconsistent results. Gray et al. 
(1995) suggest several theoretical perspectives including economic theory studies. 
Whilst Gray et al suggest some valid criticisms of this approach and in particular the 
positive accounting approach and specifically the political cost hypothesis (Milne 
2002) primarily on methodological grounds, the principal weaknesses highlighted and 
addressed in our paper are twofold. First, economic theory studies have tested only a 
narrow range of hypotheses particularly the impact of size and hence public profile. 
Second, the approach assumes that managers are attempting to stave off the regulatory 
threat and so avoid political costs. In practice any empirical test of propositions about 
size, public profile and political costs are difficult to distinguish from tests based on 
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alternative theoretical positions such as legitimacy theory (Milne, 2002). Instead of 
basing our hypotheses on what managers are trying to avoid happening, we 
concentrate instead on what they are actually doing in the firm to create 
heterogeneous resources to sustain competitive advantage in the form of enhanced 
reputation. By linking these actions to disclosure strategy, we extend the economic 
theory approach beyond positive accounting theory and seek to generate new 
empirical results.1  
    An important aspect linking corporate strategy, and disclosure strategy is a 
theoretical framework based on quality signalling (Toms, 2002). Stated briefly, this is 
founded on the notion that managers investing in activities likely to create 
environmental reputation will not be able to realise the value of reputation assets 
without making associated disclosures. The likely characteristics of such disclosure 
follows from the quality signalling literature (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) which 
suggests that signals will be of higher quality where costly and difficult to replicate. 
Toms (2002) uses this approach to link quality signalling using accounting disclosure 
to the RBV. If the link is to be maintained, it is more likely to exist where shareholders 
are active in monitoring disclosures. The Toms (2002) framework therefore also 
included governance variables to examine the inter-mediation of these factors. 
Empirical tests of the Toms (2002) framework suggested a positive 
relationship between disclosure and performance measured by reputation outcome, 
with mediating variables such as firm size, industry grouping, systematic risk, and 
diverse institutional share ownership also promoting environmental reputation. To test 
the quality signalling aspect of the framework the study used a disclosure level 
scoring system based on a qualitative hierarchy of disclosure adapted from Robertson 
and Nicholson (1996). The system gives greater weight to quantitative and verifiable 
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disclosures, which are of higher quality as disclosures in a signalling framework due 
to the difficulty of replication, and less weight to general rhetoric, which by definition 
is easier to replicate. Using this system, the hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between the quality of environmental disclosure and environmental reputation was 
supported. However, the study ignored the possibility of a similar relationship 
between quantity of environmental disclosure measured by normal content analysis 
procedures and environmental reputation. In the context of the earlier study by Toms 
(2002), the main purpose of this paper is to examine the relative significance of 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures. 
A further objective is to extend the basic model suggested in Toms (2002) to 
examine whether or not significance can be attributed to variables omitted from that 
study. There are good reasons to suppose that this might be the case. A recent study 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, p.605) suggests that R&D and corporate social 
performance are positively correlated, since many aspects of corporate social 
responsibility create either a product innovation, or process innovation, or both. It 
would therefore seem that investment in R&D is likely to assist in the creation of 
environmental reputation. This may seem counter-intuitive, for example in cases 
where research-based firms are involved in apparently unethical activities. 
McWilliams and Siegel suggest that involvement in R&D increases the firm’s 
involvement in social responsibility, for example because there is greater investment 
in attracting and retaining skilled labour. However, this does not address the question 
of purely environmental responsibility. Leaving aside managerial motives, ethical or 
otherwise for investment in R&D, the hypothesis remains, tested below, that the 
capital intensity that characterises research-based organisations increases relative 
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environmental responsibility through selection of process technology that is the most 
modern and therefore more probably environmentally friendly.  
Another potentially important variable neglected in the original study is 
corporate diversification. Diversification may allow a business to obtain privileged 
access to skills, resources, assets, or competencies that cannot be purchased by non-
diversifiers in a competitive market or replaced by some other asset that can be 
purchased competitively (Markides & Williamson, 1996). Additionally, 
diversification offers many basic advantages (Mintzberg et al., 1995). First, 
diversification encourages the efficient allocation of capital resources among the 
divisions. Second, by opening up opportunities to run individual businesses, 
diversification helps to train general managers. Third, by reducing dependence on one 
product or market, diversification spreads business risks and the consequences of 
those risks across different markets. Therefore diversification provides firms with a 
shield against downturns in single products or markets that some investors might 
welcome (Bettis & Hall, 1982). Such advantages, if believed by firms’ constituents, 
suggest that related diversification enhances firms’ reputations. Where there is less 
relatedness in diversification the effect is expected to be negative (Rumelt, 1974). 
Because a measure of relatedness is ideally required rather than a linear or even 
weighted measure of diversification, it may follow that empirical surveys are unlikely 
to quantify a precise relationship (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Moreover, 
diversification effects have not been explored hitherto in the environmental-related 
performance literature. Applying the framework set out by Toms (2002) this factor is 
important in a quality-signalling context because it widens the resource base and 
increases the likelihood within the base that managers will invest in reputation 
creating assets and report them through divisional accountability structures. Also, 
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from the perspective of quantitative content analysis, the greater the range of the 
firm’s activities the greater is the potential range of activities that must be explained 
in order to develop and protect environmental reputation. At the same time if the 
diversification threatens to damage reputation, where it is for example from low to 
high environmental impact activities, increased accounting disclosures may be 
required to mitigate the potential impact on reputation.  
 
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND SAMPLE 
The methodology adopted in the conduct of this study is the same as outlined in Toms 
(2002). In order to replicate and extend the study along the lines discussed above, data 
was collected for the variables common to both studies and measured in the same 
way. The initial sample population chosen for this study included all companies 
covered by the Management Today Britain’s ‘Most Admired Companies (MAC)’ 
2000 survey in terms of ‘community and environmental responsibility’. A total of 239 
companies were listed in this survey. Financial variables were obtained from 
Datastream and the London Business School Risk Management Service. The sample 
was reduced due to missing data on Datastream, and elsewhere for example caused 
by deletions in cases of subsequent mergers and the inappropriateness of certain ratios 
in the balance sheets of financial companies. For the latter reason banking and 
financial sectors were left out of the study. In total therefore, the sample consists of 
139 companies, which appeared on MAC published survey of environmental 
reputation, and for which data was available for all appropriate variables.   
Corporate environmental reputation (CER) data was collected from the UK 
MAC survey for 2001. Each annual survey contains all the FTSE100 British 
companies and, on average, 90% of the top 200 companies by market capitalisation. 
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The sample companies are the largest by market capitalisation from each of 26 
sectors. Each year Britain’s MAC survey asks senior executives from 260 British 
companies and senior specialist business analysts to give a rating of the performance 
of each company, other than their own in the case of executives, within their industrial 
sector.  They provide a score of 0 (= poor) to 10 (= excellent) for each of nine 
characteristics that impact on the major stakeholders, including CER, the variable of 
interest for this study. The CER variable is the average score derived from the 
individual ratings of executives and analysts combined. 
Following the discussion above, the study also contains additional variables to 
measure disclosure (DISC). In all three underlying disclosure measures were 
constructed, a qualitative measure, following Toms (2002), a quantitative measure and 
a hybrid measure and in all three cases to test the proposed cause and effect relation, 
disclosure variables were lagged by one year.  
Quality scores were identified by sentence according to the scheme described 
by Toms (2002, p.266). The best example was used to score the signal of each 
company. As suggested by Toms (2002), because disclosure is quantified, imitation is 
difficult where commitment to environmental programmes is not genuine and, where 
quantified, disclosures are more likely to represent actual activities. Further disclosure 
at lower levels where imitation is possible, is unlikely to add further value to 
reputation. More rhetorical disclosures tend to mirror activities and are by definition 
relatively cheaper than disclosures reflecting costly to imitate activities, and can 
therefore be made in large volume, leading to higher scores using standard content 
analysis.2 
The quantitative disclosure score was based on content analysis. This allowed 
the codification of text into categories based on pre-selected criteria of environmental 
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disclosure. The number of sentences was used to capture the total amount of 
environmental information within the corporate annual reports. Sentences are far more 
reliable as a basis for coding than any other unit of analysis (Milne & Adler, 1999). 
Sentences are easily identified and less subject to inter judge variation than phrases, 
clauses, or themes (Ingram & Frazier, 1980, p.617). Sentences overcome the problems 
of allocation of portions of pages and remove the need to account for, or standardise, 
the number of words and are a more natural unit of written English to count than 
words (Hackston & Milne, 1996). The percentage of total amount of environmental 
disclosure for each company is then obtained by dividing total environmental 
sentences by approximated total sentences in the corporate annual report. The total 
number of sentences used to measure disclosure volume in the current paper was the 
aggregate from the classified sentences used by Salama (2003) following the 
schematic approach of Hackston and Milne (1996). For the purposes of testing below, 
two variables were used, the total number of environmental sentences (TES) in each 
report and the percentage of each report devoted to environmental disclosure, defined 
as TES divided by the total number of all sentences (TESA). 
Finally the data set was extended to create a quality-adjusted measure of 
disclosure quantity. To do this all sentences in each report were coded by each of the 
three coders using the scheme described by Toms (2002, p.266). The quality score for 
every sentence in each report was added to compute an aggregate variable. For the 
purposes of the analysis below the resulting variable is referred to the quality 
weighted environmental disclosure (QWED). 
Each method for measuring disclosure was subjected to testing for inter-coder 
agreement, using differing alpha co-efficient of agreement according to the underlying 
data. For QUAL a sample of 60 reports was used with three coders identifying the 
 11 
 
best example on the quality scale for each report (similar to the approach in Toms, 
2002, p.269, n3). Note at this stage there is no requirement for the sentences selected 
by each coder to be the same, as it is likely that there are several instances of 
sentences achieving the same threshold score. The alpha co-efficient was calculated 
according to the method outlined by Krippendorff (1980, pp.138-139). For the TES 
variable, reproducibility was tested for a sample of reports on the sentence totals by 
the three coders using the definition provided by Waltz et al (1991, p.166). Finally to 
validate the coding process for the QWED variable, an alpha co-efficient was 
calculated according to the method outlined by Krippendorff, (1980, pp.138-139), this 
time applying it to all the sentences within a single report. For the purposes of 
reliability testing, single reports containing more than 100 sentences in section 
headings including the word ‘environmental’ were selected. Each sentence was coded 
using the 0 to 5 qualitative scale by each coder.  
In all cases alpha values of 85% and above were achieved. In the case of the 
QWED variable three rounds of testing were required to achieve this level of 
agreement. As in the Toms (2002, see table 1 for specific examples) survey the 
following categories were used in the 0 to 5 qualitative scale. No disclosure = 0; 
General rhetoric = 1; Specific endeavour; policy only = 2; Specific endeavour or 
intent, policy specified = 3; Implementation and monitoring, use of targets references 
to outcomes, but quantified results not published = 4; implementation and monitoring; 
use of targets, quantified results published = 5. Because all sentences were coded to 
compute the QWED variable, as opposed to identifying the best example in the case 
of the QUAL variable, some further refinement was necessary. Between the rounds 
extensive discussions took place to establish precise coding rules. Lead in sentences, 
without reference to the environment in themselves, but introducing environmental 
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content, were counted as zeros. Policy specification (3) and implementation and 
monitoring statements (4) were distinguished further so that statements of intent were 
scored at 3 and statements of achievement were scored at 4.  The 0 to 5 qualitative 
scale list set out above reflects these refinements and formed the basis of satisfactory 
levels of agreement at the end of the third round of testing.  
In summary, the analysis and coding of the annual reports therefore provided 
three basic variables. A quality variable, a quantity variable, and QWED, a quality 
adjusted quantity variable. The quantity variable is measured using TES and TESA as 
defined above. In all cases there is an expected positive relationship between 
disclosure and subsequent reputation, although it is also expected that different 
measures will reveal different effects. 
As in the Toms (2002) paper, shareholder power (PSH) is measured using the 
total % controlled by block shareholders. These blocks typically represent family 
holdings, trusts or other companies. Their absence is a proxy for the collective 
influence of institutional investors, who typically hold shares below the disclosure 
threshold, also reflecting the low level of individual share ownership in the modern 
UK economy. Because institutional investment is associated with low values for this 
variable, as in Toms (2002) a negative association with CER is expected. Return on 
Equity (ROE) was defined as the average ratio of pre-tax profit to equity capital for 
the period 1998-2000 inclusive. This was an inconclusive variable in the Toms 
(2002) study and sits alongside inconclusive results from other surveys (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990, Waddock & Graves, 1997). Because the purpose here is partly to 
compare and replicate Toms (2002) the variable was included in the model, but the 
relationship with the dependent variable is not specified. Size was defined as the 
value of sales turnover. It is expected that large firms will invest more in reputation 
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and that there will be a positive association between this variable and CER. 
Information for ROE t…t-2, PSH and SIZEt was obtained from Datastream for each 
company. BETAt was obtained from the London Business School Risk Measurement 
Service. As in the Toms (2002) study it is expected that firms with lower financial 
risk will be more successful in creating reputation and that there will thus be a 
negative relationship between BETA and CER. 
Also consistent with the Toms (2002) paper, a proxy for membership of 
environmentally sensitive industries was used. This was defined by the level of 
environmental capital expenditure for that industry which, according to a Department 
of the Environment (1996, p.37) survey 69% of environmental capital expenditure, 
was accounted for by six industries. These were: chemicals (22%), food processing 
(7%), paper and pulp (8%), minerals processing, taken for the purposes of this study 
to include building and aggregates, (13%), energy supply, for the purposes of this 
study including water and all utilities (7%), metals manufacture (7%) and 
rubber/plastics (5%).  For the purposes of the current study, these industries were 
defined as environmentally sensitive (ES). Given the levels of expenditure, it is also 
expected that the level of disclosure should also be high for these industries. Each 
company in the sample was analysed by sales of product and SIC code taken from 
Datastream. If any of the company’s product sales fell under an ES SIC code, ES was 
set equal to 1 and to 0 otherwise. 
In the case of the remaining new variables, R&D is measured by taking R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of sales. For the reasons discussed earlier, it is 
hypothesised that R&D will be positively associated with CER. Diversification is 
measured using the entropy measure assessed at the 3-digit level, using the following 
formula (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990):  
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Diversification % = 1- ∑
∑
j
j
j
j
Sales
Sales
2
2
)(
       (1) 
 
Where j = the number of segments and Sales refers to the percentage of the firm's total 
sales in 2000 that are in segment j. Following from the earlier discussion, the expected 
association with CER is not specified at this stage. The empirical form of the model 
and a summary of defined variables are set out below: 
 
CER  =  β0 + β1 DISC + β2 PSH + β3 BETA + β4 ROE + β5 INDUST 
   + β6 SIZE + β7 R&D + β8 DIVERS + ε    (2)  
 
Where: 
β0  =  Intercept;  
β1 to β8 = Coefficient of slope parameters;  
ε  = Error term. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
CER = Corporate environmental reputation as measured by the community and 
environmental responsibility rating for the Management Today survey of 
Britain’s MAC 2000.  
Independent Variables:  
DISC = Environmental disclosure score. Qualitative indicator (QUAL), 
ranges from 0 = no disclosure to 5 = high quality disclosure, as defined by 
Toms (2002.p.266) Quantitative indicator is measured by content analysis 
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sentence counts of 1999 annual reports and uses TES, TESA or QWED as 
defined above; 
PSH = Power of shareholders; the total percentage of shareholders groups with 
a stake of > 3% plus directors shareholdings; 
BETA = Systematic risk as measured by the company’s beta factor; 
ROE = Average return on equity from 1998-2000 inclusive as a measure of 
prior economic performance; 
INDUST = Industry classification; 
LNSIZE = log of sales turnover in 2000 as a measure of corporate size; 
R&D = Research and development expenditures, 2000; 
DIVERS = Corporate diversification. 
 
Bearing in mind that a substantial sub group of observations of the quantitative 
disclosure variable (whether measured by TES, TESA or QWED) has a value of zero, 
corresponding to companies that choose not to disclose environmental information in 
their annual reports, it is appropriate to employ a square root transformation of this 
variable to better meet the assumptions of multiple regression analysis (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996). Square root transformed variables are prefixed SQR. Sensitivity 
analysis was also performed by re-performing regressions with zero-value 
observations removed. For certain skewed explanatory variables, in this case size 
measured by sales, a logarithm transformation is sensible. Log transformed variables 
are prefixed LN. A summary of means, standard deviations and cross correlations for 
all interval variables (as transformed where indicated) is shown in Table 1. The 
QUAL variable is ordinal and its distribution is shown separately in figure 1. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Because QUAL was highly correlated with all quantity variables and QWED (table 
1), these variables were tested separately in the multiple regression analysis rather 
than jointly. The QWED variable in any case captures the joint effect of quality and 
quantity. For all remaining variables, variance inflation factors were within levels of 
tolerance for multi-collinearity.  
To examine the effects of the binary grouping by industry according to 
environmental sensitivity, the means were compared for high profile and low profile 
industries using a two tailed independent samples t-test (table 2).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
The results in table 2 suggest some important industry membership effects, with high 
levels of significance for the reputation and disclosure variables in particular. 
Consistent with previous studies (Patten, 1991, Roberts, 1992 and Hackston and 
Milne, 1996) firms in high profile industries disclose significantly more than firms in 
low profile industries. Moreover, high CER is associated with high profile industry 
group membership suggesting that firms engaged in potentially damaging activities 
are more likely to engage in reputation building activities. Meanwhile, membership of 
a high profile industry group, as suggested above, is associated with greater 
diversification. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Quality versus quantity in environmental disclosure 
The results of tests using the quality, quantity and QWED measures of disclosure 
discussed above are shown in Table 3. In Panel A, Models 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show 
the results using all co-efficients in (2) above (except R&D and DIVERS, which are 
analysed separately below). The DISC measurement is varied in each model 
respectively, to show the results from the 1997 data (QUAL97), and for all other 
models using 1999 disclosure data (QUAL99, SQRTES99 and SQRQWED99). For 
comparison purposes Model 1.1 applies the model in (2) to the 1997 data set used by 
Toms (2002).3 The model is similar, except for the exclusion of three insignificant 
variables, and directly comparable to Model 1.1 reported in Toms (2002, p.273). In 
Panel B, Models 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 show respectively the results for simple 
regression models using only the variations on the DISC measure explained above, 
without reference to the mediating and control variables. In this case the results in 
Model 1.5 are identical to those reported in Model 1.4 Toms (2002, p.273). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In tests using the quantitative disclosure variables, SQRTES consistently 
outperformed SRQTESA in all tests and for brevity, only results using SQRTES are 
reported. A significant proportion of disclosure scores were zeros (N=28), thereby 
truncating the distribution of the DISC independent variable set. Therefore all tests 
were repeated on the data set with all zero observations removed (N=111). This 
reduced data set corresponded more closely to normality than as shown for the full 
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data set in table 1. However, the results from these sets did not differ significantly 
from the tests on the full data set and therefore the latter are reported in Table 3. 
For the QUAL variables, the results are comparable with those in Toms (2002) 
in terms of the signs and significance of the co-efficients in all cases, although in 
general the level of significance is rather higher (table 3, c/f Models 1.1 and 1.2 and 
1.5 and 1.6). These results offer further support for the importance of the quality 
disclosure variable.  
Another important comparison in table 3 is between the significances of the 
qualitative (Models 1.2 and 1.6), quantitative (Models 1.3 and 1.7) and quality 
adjusted versions (Models 1.4 and 1.8) of the DISC variable. The significance of the 
DISC (QUAL) variables in both Panel A and Panel B versions of the model is much 
better in models than either DISC (SQRTES) or DISC (QWED). This is good 
evidence that qualitative disclosures have much stronger impact on reputation 
compared with mere quantity. Indeed, DISC (SQRTES) and DISC (QWED) were not 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level in the PANEL A models. In sensitivity 
analysis, this was explained mainly by the inclusion of the SIZE variable. This 
suggests that large firms, given the scope of their activities, find themselves required 
to make visible efforts to support environmentally responsible projects and therefore 
they offer greater description of environmental policies in their annual reports. It is 
possible that the investment community expects a certain amount of description and 
that therefore quantitative environmental disclosure has no incremental effect on their 
perception of corporate environmental reputation. Qualitative disclosures on the other 
hand are strongly significant in all models and add to reputation over and above any 
size effects.  
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A further and complementary effect arises from the greater significance of the 
TES variable relative to TESA. This suggests that substituting environmental 
disclosures for other disclosures has less effect on reputation than including 
environmental disclosures to extend the report so that it complements other 
disclosures. Put another way, the extent of disclosure, whether environmental or not, 
improves reputation. However, as concluded above, the overall effect of quantitative 
disclosures is limited relative to the effect of qualitative disclosures. 
Tests using the hybrid QWED variable (models 1.4 and 1.8) confirmed that 
quantity is not incrementally significant in the presence of quality. In other words, 
quality environmental disclosures add significantly to environmental reputation, 
which once achieved will not be supplemented by quantity. Conversely, as noted 
above, quantitative environmental disclosures are no different from other disclosures 
in terms of their ability to create environmental reputation.  
A final interesting comparison in table 3 is between the levels of significance 
of the LNSIZE and INDUST variables for the 1997 and 2000 data reported in Panel 
A, Model 1.1 and 1.2-1.4 respectively. According to Toms (2002), industry effects 
were significant when tested on 1996 data and the results here provide further 
evidence that industry membership is a significant control variable in the aggregate. 
Also as noted above and reported in table 2, there are significant industry impacts on 
both disclosure levels (however measured) and reputation. The results for size are 
more contradictory, and size was insignificant for all models tested on 1996 and 1997 
data (Toms. 2002, p.275). As noted above there is some evidence of an inverse 
relationship between size and the choice of disclosure method, with larger firms 
disclosing a higher volume of, but not necessarily higher quality, disclosures, possibly 
reflecting an expectational norm for high profile firms. 
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In general the results suggest support for the model tested by Toms (2002). As 
noted above, the results in Table 3 for models 1.1, 1.2, 1.5 and 1.6 have similar 
coefficients with the same signs and levels of significance when compared to the 
results in Toms (2002, table 4, p.273). This out of sample test provides confirmation 
of the original model in Toms (2002). The slightly reduced significance of the TES and 
QWED variables, but otherwise similar results in Table 3 suggest that had the original 
Toms (2002) test been conducted with reference to quantitative data alone the 
relationship between disclosure and reputation may have been less clearly apparent.  
As in these previous tests, BETA and PSH are consistently significant in all models 
although there is some interaction between PSH and SIZE and INDUST, reflecting 
the institutional control of larger Plcs in high profile industries. 
 
Extensions to the signalling and RBV framework 
Table 4 sets out the results from tests examining the impact of R&D and DIVERS 
variables. Model 2.1 shows the results for the full model set out in (2), in this case 
including the R&D and DIVERS variables. In view of the results from the previous 
sections QUAL99 is used as the DISC variable. Models 2.2 and 2.3 respectively show 
the separate effects of adding R&D and DIVERS in turn to the same variables as in 
model 2.1. Finally Model 2.4 shows the results with all insignificant variables 
removed. All Models were tested for sensitivity using other permutations of the DISC 
variable. 
The additional variables added significant explanatory power to the model. 
The R&D coefficient was highly significant in all models. Industry norms were 
important determinants with further sensitivity tests on the model showing that the 
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industry variable became more significant if the R&D variable was dropped and vice 
versa. Nonetheless the results on the R&D variable including the industry control 
showed that specific research-intensive firms are more easily able to create 
environmental reputation. In contrast, diversification was in most models insignificant 
and only marginally significant in association with quantitative disclosures. Creation 
of environmental reputation would therefore appear to be more associated with 
process than scope of the business. As noted above, table 2 suggests that diversified 
firms are more likely to be members of high profile industry groups. However the 
DIVERS variable needs to be treated with caution as the direction of its impact on 
reputation is uncertain (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Further tests (and see also table 
1) revealed that diversification is significantly associated and positively correlated 
with both reputation and especially the QUAL variable. To assess the joint effects an 
interaction variable was created combining QUAL and DIVERS. This showed 
DIVERS to be negatively associated with CER at marginal significance with the 
interaction variable strongly and positively significant. A possible interpretation is 
that diversification into such industries reduces reputation but also creates the 
requirement to include more qualitative signals to counter the potential loss of 
reputation. Diversified firms therefore must report their activities as a consequence of 
their activities, but are less able to develop reputation than more specialised firms. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
  Taken together these findings suggest that environmental reputation can be 
created more effectively by qualitative environmental disclosures and also by 
 22 
 
investment in R&D. Institutional share ownership helps promote environmental 
reputation. The results are robust with respect to recent UK data for the sectors 
analysed here, which exclude banking and other financial firms, and these 
relationships are therefore likely to reflect the information demanded by the main 
users of annual reports.  
There is still a lack of comparable international evidence, but it is likely that 
similar relationships may hold to the extent that similar conditions of regulation, 
governance and financial reporting prevail.  Even so, the results from this research 
might be added to the body of literature investigating the social performance social 
disclosure relationship, where the results are mixed (Ullmann, 1985, p.545) and 
surveys comparing actual pollution performance with pollution disclosure, which 
suggest little correlation (Milne & Patten, 2002, pp.391-2).  An important reason for 
these differences is that the evidence presented in this paper is quite narrowly focused 
on the motivations of executive and financial market stakeholder groups. Other 
surveys test the legitimacy of corporate actions against the expectations of 
environmentalists, regulators and so on. The current paper is limited by its use of the 
MAC data, which is drawn from a survey of senior executives and sector specific 
investment analysts, and also by the derivation of its theoretical framework from 
competitive process and financial market perspectives. A further test of the specific 
link between reputation resources, quality signalling and disclosure strategy across 
different stakeholder groups would be difficult insofar as their expectations differ. 
Only where they coincide, for example if a regulatory intervention affects the 
competitive process and stock market value, does the current model apply. 
Another important context in which these results need to be considered is the 
recent research by Chan and Milne (1999), consistent with earlier findings (Bowman 
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& Haire, 1975), which suggests that there is an upper limit beyond which investors 
are likely to find environmental expenditure undesirable. Whilst the results above are 
suggestive that there is a qualitative hierarchy of disclosure, the research has not 
directly tested the existence of an upper limit to environmental expenditure and 
associated quantified disclosure. However, the apparent lack of further impact in 
disclosure once a threshold has been reached does suggest some support for this view. 
In the light of the prior research, it is acknowledged that such a limit does exist and 
that the results presented here should be considered as strategic options within a 
normal range of activity dictated by current technology and the regulatory framework. 
Further research is also required on the social, as opposed to environmental, 
elements of accounting disclosure. A limitation of the above results is that the MAC 
ratings refer to both community and environmental reputation. Further research might 
also be conducted on the combined effect of multiple signals at any given level vis a 
vis equivalent single signals. Meanwhile the implication for researchers is that content 
analysis and the counting of sentences can be complemented and in certain 
circumstances significantly improved by investigating and comparing the quality of 
disclosures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Bearing in mind the above caveats, this paper demonstrates significant 
empirical support for a new theoretical perspective on the corporate social 
responsibility research agenda. The RBV is in itself not new, although the paper 
shows that it can only be made meaningful where integrated with quality signalling, 
thereby showing that RBV researchers can constructively engage with accounting and 
finance perspectives.  Based on this study, two important implications for accounting 
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researchers are that first, content analysis based on the mere volume of disclosures 
may be insufficient for the purposes of identifying the underlying relationships tested 
in this paper. Second, signalling theory potentially offers useful theoretical 
perspectives complementary to those offered elsewhere in the literature. 
The clear message to managers seeking to promote the environmental 
reputation of their firms is that they should pay careful attention to the quality rather 
than mere quantity of disclosure. This simple prescription is not easy to achieve, 
however, since disclosure must follow prior investment in environmentally friendly 
processes that are by definition difficult to imitate and are therefore potential sources 
of competitive advantage. Once that investment is made, however, disclosure will 
help secure environmental reputation and firms will find it much easier to protect their 
reputation from competitors offering up mere rhetoric. Such disclosures may be 
assisted or complemented by investments in R&D, which provide an opportunity to 
invest in modern and therefore, more environmentally friendly technology.  Whether 
these activities will ultimately benefit other stakeholder groups or provide any 
increase in overall environmental protection is an important question, but remains for 
now a subject of wider debate and further research. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Continuous Variables 
 
 
 
Variable   Mean  S.D A B C D E F G H I  
 
 
A CER  5.533 0.832   
B DISC (QUAL99)   2.388       na .466a* 
C   DISC (SQRTES99)  2.837 2.008 .329* .721a* 
D DISC (SQRQWED99) 5.076 3.612 .319* .721a* .993* 
E PSH  27.116 20.651 -.338* -.235a* -.178* -.179*  
F BETA  0.919 0.245 -.179* -.049a .033 -.035 -.002    
G ROCE  30.101 64.043 -.128 -.193a* -.214* -.212* -.003 .045   
H LNSIZE  6.187 0.559 .416* .342a* .341* .345* -.396* .158 -.058   
I R&D  0.009 0.028 .221* .264a* .037 .023 -.147 .087 -.050  .009 
J DIVERS  0.222 0.240 .266* .314a* .185* .182* -.292* .114 -.073  .278* .034  
 
 
 
CER: Corporate environmental reputation; DISC (QUAL99) qualitative disclosure measure, t=1999; DISC (SQRTES99), quantitative disclosure measure 
using total environmental sentences, t=1999; DISC (SQRQWED99) quality adjusted quantitative disclosure measure using quality adjusted total 
environmental sentences, t=1999; PSH: Power of shareholders, % of shareholders groups with a stake of > 3% plus directors shareholdings; BETA: Beta; 
ROE: Return on capital employed; LNSIZE: Log of sales turnover; R&D: Research and development expenditures; DIVERS: Corporate diversification. 
 
a Spearman’s rank correlation; Pearson correlation co-efficients are used otherwise 
 
*p < .05 
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TABLE 2 
 
Mean difference tests for independent samples by industry 
 
    
Mean high Mean low Mean  SE of 
   Profile  profile  difference diff. t-value  
 
 
Dependent variable 
CER   5.813  5.309  0.504  0.136 3.681*** 
 
Independent variables 
QUAL99  2.919  1.961  0.958  0.252 3.798*** 
SQRTES99  3.688  2.152  1.535  0.321 4.782*** 
SQRQWED99  6.554  3.888  2.669  0.578 4.611*** 
PSH   23.018  30.416  -7.398  3.380 2.188** 
BETA   0.889  0.943  -0.053  0.042 1.251 
ROE   19.492  38.644  -19.151  9.748 1.965* 
LNSIZE  6.256  6.131  0.124  0.095 1.311 
R&D   0.012  0.007  0.005  0.004 1.158 
DIVERS  0.315  0.148  0.166  0.039 4.259*** 
 
 
Industry is portioned into 62 high profile and 77 low profile cases 
 
Significance levels (two-tailed test): 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
* p < .10 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Community and Environmental Reputation: Effects of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Disclosures 
 
Dependent Variable  = CER score 
 
Panel A 
      Model 
    (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4)  
Independent variable 
CONSTANT   6.710*** 3.435*** 3.165*** 3.148*** 
  (6.11)  (4.60)  (4.34)  (4.32) 
DISC (QUAL97)  0.167***    
  (3.08) 
DISC (QUAL99)    0.153*** 
    (3.64) 
DISC (SQRTES99)      0.052* 
        (1.52) 
DISC (SQRQWED99)        0.025* 
          (1.41) 
PSH    -0.009** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
    (1.98)  (2.63)  (2.43)  (2.44)  
BETA    -0.828** -0.687*** -0.731*** -0.730*** 
    (2.04)  (2.95)  (2.97)  (2.95)  
ROE    -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0007  -0.0007 
    (.014)  (0.51)  (1.36)  (1.41) 
IND    0.122  0.218**  0.264**  0.273** 
    (0.81)  (1.73)  (1.95)  (2.04) 
LNSIZE   -0.042  0.396*** 0.481*** 0.485***
    (0.63)  (3.36)  (4.20)  (4.26) 
    
F    4.55  11.82  10.35  10.29 
Adj. R2    .215  0.375  0.324  0.322 
N    126  139  139  139 
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TABLE 3 (CONT.) 
Determinants of Community and Environmental Reputation: Effects of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Disclosures 
 
Dependent Variable  = CER score 
 
Panel B 
      Model 
    (1.5)  (1.6)  (1.7)  (1.8)  
Independent variable 
CONSTANT   5.042  4.952*** 5.147*** 5.161*** 
  (42.14)  (45.42)  (48.15)  (48.90) 
DISC (QUAL97)  0.204***   
  (4.55) 
DISC (QUAL99)    0.243*** 
    (6.13) 
DISC (SQRTES99)      0.136*** 
        (4.13) 
DISC (SQRQWED99)        0.073*** 
          (4.08) 
 
F    20.71  20.52  17.06  16.62 
R2    0.151  0.309  0.108  0.101 
N    126  139  139  139 
 
 
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
estimation matrix. 
Significance levels (one-tailed test except intercept terms and the ROE variable): 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
* p < .10 
 
CER: Corporate environmental reputation; DISC (QUAL99) qualitative disclosure measure, 
t=1999; DISC (QUAL97), qualitative disclosure measure, t=1997; DISC (SQRTES99), 
quantitative disclosure measure using total environmental sentences, t=1999; DISC 
(SQRQWED99) quality adjusted quantitative disclosure measure using quality adjusted total 
environmental sentences, t=1999; PSH: Power of shareholders, % of shareholders groups with 
a stake of > 3% plus directors shareholdings; BETA: Beta; ROCE: Return on capital 
employed; INDUST: Industry classification; LNSIZE: Log of sales turnover. 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of Community and Environmental Reputation: R&D and Diversification 
 
      
Dependent Variable = CER score 
 
      Model 
   (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.3)  (2.4)  
  
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
CONSTANT 3.319*** 3.273*** 3.476*** 3.268*** 
 (4.73) (4.70) (4.63) (4.73) 
DISC (QUAL99) 0.157*** 0.161 0.149*** 0.162***  
 (3.74) (3.88) (3.52) (4.02) 
PSH -0.004** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (1.93) (2.07) (2.51) (2.08) 
BETA -0.793*** -0.767*** -0.708*** -0.768*** 
 (3.49) (3.39) (3.02) (3.40) 
ROE -0.001 -0.001 -0.002   
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.50)    
INDUST 0.155 0.182* 0.195* 0.183*   
 (1.23) (1.49) (1.49) (1.51) 
LNSIZE 0.407*** 0.417*** 0.338*** 0.416***  
 (3.70) (3.81) (3.27) (3.83) 
R&D 6.339*** 6.290***  6.302*** 
 (3.78) (3.65)  (3.72) 
DIVERS 0.202  0.174 
 (0.86)  (0.72) 
     
 
F 13.29 15.02 10.07 17.26 
Adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.42 
N 139 139 139 139 
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
estimation matrix. 
Significance levels (one-tailed test except intercept terms and the ROE variable): 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
* p < .10 
 
CER: Corporate environmental reputation; DISC (QUAL99) qualitative disclosure measure, 
t=1999; PSH: Power of shareholders; BETA: Beta; ROCE: Return on capital employed; 
INDUST: Industry classification; LNSIZE: Log of sales turnover; R&D: Research and 
development expenditures; DIVERS: Corporate diversification. 
 34
Figure 1: Distribution of QUAL variable
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NOTES 
 
                                                          
1 As argued elsewhere (Toms, 2004), the RBV approach is consistent with classical 
political economy and associated theories of value.  We agree with Gray et al (1995) 
that assumptions about self-interest are required and acknowledge that some may find 
them offensive, but consider them nonetheless accurate descriptors of constrained 
managerial behaviour in the context of a capitalist economy.  
2 We are grateful for a referee’s comment that in some cases expenditure on 
disclosure may nonetheless be greater than expenditure on the activities themselves, 
with other firms engaging expensive public relations firms for reputation management 
purposes. For examples see www.corpwatch.org 
3  For the purposes of comparison, as in Toms (2002), the QUAL variable is not 
transformed. The models were tested using SQRQUAL on 1997 and 1999 data, but 
there were no significant differences between these results and the results as reported 
using untransformed data. 
